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Results of measurements give legitimacy to a physical theory. What if acquiring these results in the
first place necessitates what the same theory considers to be an interaction? In this note, we assume
that theories account for interactions so that they are empirically traceable, and that observations
necessarily go with such an interaction with the observed system. We investigate consequences of
this assumption: The unfolding language game, inspired by “quantum logic,” leads to a class of
contextual and probabilistic theories. Contextuality becomes a means to render interactions, thus
also measurements, empirically tangible. The measurement “problem” arises in all such theories,
not only quantum mechanics: It is a consequence of the need for empirical evidence of interactions.
And a consequence of the converse need for an interaction when obtaining that empirical evidence.
I. INTRODUCTION
The infamous Wigner’s-friend experiment [1–3] serves
to illustrate the measurement problem: If we imagine
Wigner performing a measurement on his friend who
measured another system, there are different—in fact,
incommensurable—uses of the term “measurement:”
(M1) If the friend’s “measurement” of a state in an
equal superposition with respect to his measure-
ment basis is regarded as an interaction between
two systems—modelled by a physical evolution—,
then it corresponds to a unitary on the joint sys-
tem, yielding an entangled joint state;
(M2) if the “measurement” leads to an account of expe-
rience that serves as a normative judgement about
the validity of a theory, we expect exclusively one
of several possible outcomes.
Statements (M1) and (M2) are in conflict in two respects:
On the one hand, there is a fundamental separation due
to the nature of language: A meaningful account of expe-
rience cannot be exhaustively captured by an interaction
as expressed in the language of one theory [4]. On the
other hand, the linearity of quantum mechanics cannot
be reconciled with value-definiteness—i.e., the outcome
being exclusively one of several possibilities.
The latter incommensurability is not so much a
peculiarity—or defect—of quantum mechanics. Instead,
we argue that it appears in theories that (a) account
for interactions so that they are empirically significant,
and (b) require that an observation necessarily goes with
such an interaction. An observation is then itself empir-
ically traceable. The two requirements above are com-
bined in the interaction assumption:
(IntA) Interactions are empirically traceable. An observa-
tion necessitates such an interaction.
The incommensurability in the measurement problem
can, therefore, be regarded as a consequence of the in-
teraction assumption.
In order to determine the accounts of experience that
are compatible quantum mechanics—or, conversely, the
theories
interaction assumption verifiability
Sec. II Sec. III
Sec. IV, V
App. B
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Figure 1. We investigate how the interaction assumption and
a concept of verifiability can be combined.
accounts that falsify quantum mechanics—, we have to
connect statements (M1) and (M2). If they are incom-
mensurable, then a bridge is needed: the Born rule. The
necessity of a “Born rule” is tightly connected to the
measurement problem and can as well be traced back to
the interaction assumption (IntA). We argue that both
appear in a wider class of physical theories that satisfy
the interaction assumption, not just quantum mechanics.
The structure of the article is illustrated in Figure 1:
Our understanding of an “interaction,” relies on the no-
tion of a “system” which we discuss in Section II. In
Section III, we develop the notion of verifiability, a con-
cept constitutive to natural sciences. We then investi-
gate in Sections IV and V how the notion of verifiable
information can be reconciled with empirically tangible
interactions as required by (IntA). In Section VI, we join
the equivalence relation arising from the demand for ver-
ifiability with the lattice structure inspired by quantum
logic (see Appendix C). In Appendix A, we show how the
resolution restriction emerges in theories with an inter-
action assumption, and in Appendix B, we discuss reper-
cussions of the above for quantum mechanics.
II. SYSTEMS AND INTERACTIONS
In the following, we contextualize the interaction assump-
tion (IntA): Interactions are understood as a particular
way in which two systems relate to one another (see Fig-
ure 2). In Sections IIA and II B, we thus examine the
notion of a “system:” On the one hand, the scientific
2quest for empirical confirmation and reproducibility re-
quires a context in which statements can only depend on
that context. On the other hand, as discussed in Sec-
tion II C, if an observation is not a “spooky action at a
distance,” the observer and the observed entity cannot
be regarded as independent.
system
interaction
Figure 2. The notion of an interaction and the notion of a
(isolated) system are closely related.
A. Separability
The natural sciences rely essentially on empirically con-
firming statements—as we discuss in greater detail in Sec-
tion III. We, therefore, require that there is a context in
which there are statements with a clearly confined depen-
dence. Einstein’s separability assumption—effectively a
non-signalling assumption—ensures that we can mean-
ingfully say something about an “entity” or “system,”
independently of its environment, that is, independently
of parts external to the system:1
that which we conceive as existing (‘actual’)
should somehow be localized in time and
space. That is, the real in one part of
space, A, should (in theory) somehow ‘ex-
ist’ independently of that which is thought
of as real in another part of space, B. If a
physical system stretches over the parts of
space A and B, then what is present in B
should somehow have an existence indepen-
dent of what is present in A. What is actually
present in B should thus not depend upon the
type of measurement carried out in the part
of space, A; it should also be independent of
whether or not, after all, a measurement is
made in A. [6, §5 (translated quote from [7])]
The above contradicts the experimental findings on
non-locality [8, 9] if separability is turned into a suffi-
cient condition in the following sense: Measurements on
parts, together with previously shared information, re-
veal the results of any measurement that can possibly
be performed on the combined system. We must, there-
fore, allow for measurements on the combined system
that cannot be characterized by measurements on the
parts together with previously shared information.
1 Quantum mechanics accounts for this by the partial trace being
sufficient to derive all measurement results about the subsystem
(see, e.g., [5]).
B. The notion of a “system”
Einstein combines the assumption of systems being sep-
arately describable with the observation of the “worldly
origin” of our terms:2
However, if one renounces the assumption
that what is present in different parts of space
has an independent, real existence, then I do
not at all see what physics is supposed to
describe. For what is thought to be a ‘sys-
tem’ is, after all, just conventional, and I do
not see how one is supposed to divide up
the world objectively so that one can make
statements about the parts. [6, §5 (translated
quote from [7])]
If one abstains from supposing privileged linguistic means
that “define” what are “the systems,” then we are lead
to allow for an unrestricted choice of what to consider as
a system. Thus, in light of the considerations in Sec-
tion IIA, we require that whatever we call a system
has an independent description: Our choice of a “sys-
tem” should not affect the ability to formulate indepen-
dent statements about that system.
Whereas a theory with this flexibility as to what counts
as a “system” allows for ample applications, it deprives
the term of its sortal character and thus its ability to es-
tablish identity:3 If anything can be regarded as a sys-
tem, nothing is essentially a system. The mere charac-
ter trait of “constituting a system” does not provide the
means to identify the system. To meaningfully say some-
thing about a system, however, requires us to identify
and refer to that system.4 So, a theory that states what
can be said about a system, and that comes with the
flexibility regarding the choice of the system, necessarily
relies on other linguistic means to establish the reference
2 “Terms that have proven useful for the ordering of things attain
easily such an authority over us so that we forget their worldly
origin and we accept them as unalterable facts. They are, then,
put down as ‘thinking-necessities,’ ‘a priori given,’ etc. The path
of scientific progress is often made impassable for a long time by
such misconceptions.” [10, p. 102, own translation]
3 “A criterion is a way of recognizing something, or a feature by
which we can recognize something. A criterion of identity is
something by which we can recognize the correctness of a state-
ment of identity. Questions of identity make sense only once we
have specified what kind of thing is at issue. One cannot sim-
ply ask ‘Is this the same as that?’, but only ‘Is this the same S
as that’, where ‘S’ is a sortal term like ‘table’ or ‘planet’. Ac-
cordingly, a criterion of identity is a feature which determines
whether or not an object falling under ‘S’ that we encounter
in one context or refer to in one way is the same as an object
falling under ‘S’ that we encounter in another context or refer to
in another way.” [11, §2.2]
4 “Another possible interpretation of the slogan [‘no entity without
identity’] [. . . ] might run something like this: ‘There is nothing
you can sensibly talk about without knowing, at least in princi-
ple, how it might be identified.’ I have nothing to say against
this admirable maxim.” [12, §1]
3to that system.5 Furthermore, if a theory does not allow
to identify its systems, it does also not allow to identify
any potential thing-in-itself associated with systems (see
also Appendix B).
C. No observation at a distance
Despite the possibility of statements independent of the
environment of a system, we have to allow for changes
of a system that are the effect of an external cause. Re-
garding an observer as a system, we have to account for
the external cause of his sensory perceptions. This does
neither imply that this description of the observer is ex-
haustive, nor imply the ability to conclude what is the
observer’s account of experience [4]. It merely requires
an interaction as the necessary requirement for the ex-
ternal cause of his sensory perception. We, thus, restrict
separability in the sense that a system is either inde-
pendently describable—it is isolated—, or it interacts
with its environment—i.e., with other systems external
to it. There is, therefore, a dichotomy between systems
that are independently describable versus systems that
interact with their environment—with such an interac-
tion, seemingly contradictory, being at the core of “say-
ing something about a system.”
The interaction assumption (IntA) demands that these
interactions themselves have empirically detectable ef-
fects. An interaction is, therefore, not an abstract term
beyond our experience but it becomes itself meaningful. If
an observation is necessarily accompanied by an interac-
tion, it must be empirically detectable as well. There is
no “observation at a distance,” just as there is no action
at a distance.
The importance of an interaction has been emphasized
before. Bohr, in his reply [14] to the EPR paper [15], em-
phasizes the role of interactions to refute the notion of
a “[prediction] without without in any way disturbing a
system” [15]—the idea of innocently reading off measure-
ment results:6
Indeed the finite interaction between object
and measuring agencies conditioned by the
very existence of the quantum of action
5 In [13], Mittelstaedt proposes a “quantum ontology.” The author
rightly points out the inability to re¨ıdentify a “quantum object.”
Thus, the “quantum ontology” cannot suffice to meaningful refer
to either a system or a “quantum object.” Even if quantum
mechanics is “nearer to the ‘truth’ than classical mechanics” [13,
p.9], it cannot be the “whole truth.”
6 Dewey observes the one-sided effect of an “interaction:” “The
theory of knowing is modelled after what was supposed to take
place in the act of vision. The object refracts light to the eye
and is seen; it makes a difference to the eye and to the person
having an optical apparatus, but none to the thing seen. The
real object is the object so fixed in its regal aloofness that it is a
king to any beholding mind that may gaze upon it. A spectator
theory of knowledge is the inevitable outcome.” [16, §1, p.26]
entails—because of the impossibility of con-
trolling the reaction of the object on the mea-
suring instruments if these are to serve their
purpose—the necessity of a final renunciation
of the classical ideal of causality and a radical
revision of our attitude towards the problem
of physical reality. [14]
In a similar vein, Popper in [17] exposes an essential
shortcoming of classical mechanics: If classical mechan-
ics did account for the interactions that finally led to
our experiences—if it did satisfy the interaction assump-
tion (IntA)—, then it would be indeterministic. Instead,
classical mechanics relies on other theories to account
for causal connections in an observation: The electro-
magnetic interactions allowing to measure position and
momentum have negligible disturbing effects.7
III. VERIFIABILITY
A. Equivalent questions
If physics, in the spirit of Einstein’s quote in Section II B
above, strives to make “statements about parts of the
world,” then we require that statements can repeatedly
be empirically confirmed—they are verifiable. Popper
states in [19] that the “scientifically meaningful physical
effect” is characterized by being reproducible—regularly
and by anybody who builds the experiment according to
the instructions.8 This supposes that there exists the
possibility to refer to or mean the “same experiment” for
different points in space and time (“regularly”), and by
different observers (“anybody”). We, therefore, assume:9
(EQ) There is an equivalence between questions. If and
only if an observation yields an equal answer to an
equivalent question, then the second answer con-
firms the first.
7 In [18], Aerts distinguishes between “theories of system” and
“theories of measurements.” The former “predict” results of
measurements. The latter account for disturbances by the mea-
surement. Classical and quantum mechanics both belong to the
former. Complementarity is then, according to Aerts, not a dis-
turbance by a measurement, but the inability to predict with
certainty. We neither follow the distinction regarding theories
nor the author’s statement that “The aim of a physical theory of
the physical system is to ‘predict’ the result of a certain test, and
this prediction is done before the test is carried out and no matter
whether the test will be carried out.” [18, p.2442] This charac-
terization of the aim of physics requires an a priori meaning of
a “certain test” independent from running that test, contrary to
our belief that meaning is established within the context of a
language game.
8 “Der wissenschaftlich belangvolle physikalische Effekt kann ja
geradezu dadurch definiert werden, daß er sich regelma¨ßig und
von jedem reproduzieren la¨ßt, der die Versuchsanordnung nach
Vorschrift aufbaut.” [19, §I.8]
9 We do not specify how this equivalence is established (see also
last paragraph in Section IVA).
4The assumption does not imply that there is an a priori
fixed meaning of “experiment built according to the in-
structions” captured in a particular privileged language.
The assumption (EQ) of the possibility to ask semanti-
cally equivalent questions can be read as: There is the
possibility to establish identical meaning and thus equiva-
lent questions for both different points in space and time,
as well as different observers.
While we assume that there are equivalent questions,
we do not assume that equivalent questions always have
equal answers. Rather, we use in Section IVA that an-
swers can depend on the context, i.e., they can be contex-
tual.
To capture the above formally, we assume that ques-
tions in a given experimental context are represented by
elements of a set Q. Two questions Q1, Q2 ∈ Q are
equivalent in the above sense (see Section IIIA) if and
only if Q1 and Q2 are ∼-equivalent, i.e., Q1 ∼ Q2. If we
“ask the same question twice,” we are referring to two
non-equal ∼-equivalent questions
Q1, Q2 ∈ Q : Q1 ∼ Q2 ∧ Q1 6= Q2 .
Thus, the elements in Q have usually a time-stamp or a
similar parameter that allows for a distinction between,
e.g., the question “what is the momentum at time t1”
and the question “what is the momentum at time t2”
where t1 6= t2.
We assume another set A of answer to questions in Q.
We write (Q,A) to associate the answer A with a ques-
tion Q. For now, we assume the elements in Q to cor-
respond to binary questions, i.e., questions with two
possible answers, t and f. Thus, the set of answers
is A = {t, f}.
Theories associate answers to questions. For now, we
take a theory to be deterministic in the sense that it
associates each question Q ∈ Q with an answer A ∈
{t, f}. The association of an answer to a question may be
contextual in the sense that the theory associates answers
to any finite subset of questions Q ⊂ Q dependent on that
subset. Conversely, a theory is called non-contextual if it
associates answers to questions independently of other
questions (see Section IVB).
B. Identical systems
In two subsequent measurements in one run of a Stern-
Gerlach experiment, we assume that we refer to two mea-
surements of the same silver atom—i.e., of the identical
entity as depicted in Figure 4. Observations then yield
attributes of one single entity. Thus, two questions may
be equivalent insofar as they refer to the identical en-
tity. This yields a second equivalence relation, ∼s, on Q.
While questions equivalent with respect to ∼ may refer
to the same kind of entity in, e.g., different runs of the
same experimental setup, questions that are equivalent
with respect to ∼s refer to the same entity within the
one particular run.
verifiable information
equivalent questions
∼Sec. ?? ∼s Sec. III B
≡
Corresponds to as-
sumption (EQ)
Reference to the
identical system
Figure 3. Requiring verifiability leads to an equivalence of
questions (∼). Further, we introduce an equivalence relation
for questions about the identical system (∼s). The intersec-
tion of the two, ∼-equivalent questions about the identical
system, is denoted by ≡.
Q1,1 Q1,2
Q2,1 Q2,2
∼
≡
∼
s
Figure 4. Imagine, for instance, different runs of a Stern-
Gerlach experiment. Within each run, there are two measure-
ment. The bases in each of these measurements can be chosen.
Thus, the set of questions isQ = {(A, i, j)|A ∈ End(C2), A† =
A, i ∈ N+, j ∈ {0, 1}}. Two measurements are ∼-equivalent if
the measurement bases coincide. Two measurements are ∼s-
equivalent if they are in the same run, i.e., if the corresponding
questions have the same first index. If in the same run two
questions are ∼-equivalent, then they are ≡-equivalent.
The equivalence relation of ∼-equivalent questions re-
ferring to the identical system, i.e., the intersection of ∼
and ∼s, is then denoted as ≡. In this sense, performing
two measurements in the same basis does not constitute
asking the same question but asking equivalent questions
with respect to the relation ≡.
In summary, we have introduced two notions of equiva-
lence of questions that reflect essentially asking the same
question about the same (type of) entity, ∼, and about
the same (identical) entity, ≡. The latter corresponds to
asking ∼-equivalent questions referring to the identical
system, i.e., that are ∼s-equivalent.
5IV. INTERACTION ASSUMPTION
FOR VERIFIABLE INFORMATION
We combine the notion of verifiable information es-
tablished in Section III with the interaction assump-
tion (IntA) motivated in Section II. First, in Sec-
tion IVA, we contrast isolated systems against systems
that interact with their environment. This leads us to
turn to probabilistic and contextual theories. As discussed
in Section IVB, a Born rule then becomes an essential
part of the theory. In Section IVC, we examine connec-
tions to the BB84 key-agreement protocol. Subsequently,
in Section V, we consider interactions between different
parts of an isolated system, and how they relate to the
measurement problem.
A. Interactions and isolated systems
a. Isolated systems. We first characterize what it
means for a system not to interact with its environment:
A system S is isolated if and only if equivalent ques-
tions referring to that system yield same answers. We
follow the intuition that “being isolated” is a property of
a particular system S. Thus, the notion of being isolated
relies merely on questions in one particular equivalence
class Q˜s—of ∼s-equivalent questions referring to S:
S is isolated if and only if (1)
∀Q ∈ Q˜s with (Q,A) : ∀Q′ ≡ Q : (Q′, A) .
For isolated systems, ≡-equivalent questions (∼- and
∼s-equivalent, see Section III B) obtain the same an-
swers (see Figure 5).
“the system”
Q1 Q2
A1 A2 = A1
≡
Figure 5. In an isolated system, ≡-equivalent questions about
the identical system, Q1 ≡ Q2 (i.e., Q1 ∼ Q2 ∧ Q1 ∼
s Q2),
yield the same answer A1 = A2. The reference to the same
system is indicated by the dotted line.
b. Transitivity. We take the relations ∼ and ∼s to
be proper equivalence relations, in particular transitive.
To ensure consistence with our notion of isolated sys-
tems, an interaction that reproduces valid information—
that yields an answer to a previously asked equivalent
question—leaves an isolated system undisturbed. An iso-
lated system may interact with its environment to inquire
about equivalent questions without being disturbed as
depicted in Figure 6. In other words: By transitivity we
cannot distinguish whether a system is not interact with
at all or whether it is interacted with to inquire about an
equivalent question.
Q1 Q2 Q3
A1 A2 A3 = A1
Figure 6. By transitivity of the equivalence relation ∼, asking
an equivalent question Q2 ≡ Q1 does not disturb the system:
The answer to another equivalent question Q3 ≡ Q1—short
for Q2 ∼ Q1 ∧Q1 ∼
s Q2—is still the same, A3 = A1.
c. Empirically tangible interactions. The interac-
tion assumption demands that we are able to distinguish
between a system that is isolated and a system that
has been interacted with to inquire non-implied infor-
mation.10 We extend the interaction assumption (IntA)
slightly: Not only do we assume that there is an interac-
tion corresponding to every inquiry about a system. For
every interaction, there is also a corresponding question
an observer equivalently could have inquired about.11
We, therefore, treat all interactions of a system with its
environment as if an observer is inquiring about a ques-
tion in Q.
Q1 Q2 Q3
A1 A2 A3 6= A1
≡
Figure 7. Asking a non-equivalent question about a system
disturbs it in the sense that equivalent questions about it,
Q1 ≡ Q3, yield different answers.
If we require the empirical evidence for an interaction
to stem merely from inquiries about the system under
consideration, we are lead to establish an interaction as
a violation of the criterion for isolated systems : An inter-
action has to disturb the system. We are, thus, left with
a contextual theory in the sense of Paragraph ??. Let us
consider successive inquiries about three questions that
refer to the same system, i.e., that are ∼s-equivalent, as
depicted in Figure 7. Say we inquired about the first
question Q1 and obtained an answer A1. Any inquiry
about a non-implied question Q2—this implies that Q2 6≡
Q1—should alter the answer to questions Q3 ≡ Q1. In
a deterministic theory with an interaction assumption,
the answer A3 is then ¬A1 (“not A1”). This, how-
ever, has problematic consequences for binary questions
in Q: Let us consider inquiries about ≡-equivalent ques-
tions, Q1, Q3, and Q5. Between these, there are inquiries
about non-implied questions,Q2 andQ4, as shown in Fig-
ure 8. Both Q2 and Q4 disturb the answers to the other
10 The action of an eavesdropper can then be detected as we will
discuss in Section IVC.
11 In fact, requiring that there should not be any qualitative differ-
ence between interactions can be read this way.
6questions. Thus, inquiring about Q5 yields an answer
A5 = ¬A3 = ¬(¬A1) = A1 .
The answers A1 = A5 to the questions Q1 ≡ Q5 let
the system appear to be isolated—despite the inquiries
of non-implied questions. By the pigeon-hole principle,
this extends to any finite set of answers. We arrive at
an inconsistent triad : A theory cannot (a) satisfy the
interaction assumption, (b) refer to a finite number of
questions, and (c) be deterministic. A “spectator the-
ory” [16] like classical mechanics (see Section II C) does
not satisfy the first requirement. Giving up the second
requirement leads a theory based on, e.g., ternary logic
as suggested by Reichenbach [20–23]. Loosening the last
requirement, as we will do subsequently, takes us in the
direction of quantum mechanics.
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5
A1 A2 A3 6= A1 A4 A5 6= A3
≡ ≡
Figure 8. In a deterministic theory, binary questions with an
interaction assumption lead to a contradiction: As between
each pair of the equivalent questions, Q1 ≡ Q3 ≡ Q5, there
is a non-implied question, the answers should all differ al-
beit ¬¬A1 = A5.
d. Probabilistic theories. The inconsistent triad
above can be escaped by turning to probabilistic theories
with an adapted notion of isolated systems: A system is
isolated if and only if equivalent questions regarding the
same system yield same answers with certainty. That is,
any question can be asked again with the same result:12
S is isolated if and only if (2)
∀Q ∈ Q with (Q,A) : ∀Q′ ≡ Q : (Q′, A) .
Being isolated is not anymore a property of a single sys-
tem, but rather of an equivalence class of such systems,
e.g., across different runs of an experiment. Thus, with
the term “system” we refer from now on implicitly to
such an equivalence class, and we assume that the set
of questions Q is associated with such a class of equiv-
alent systems. Then, a system is isolated if for arbi-
trarily many runs of the experiment, inquiring about ≡-
equivalent questions yields same answers—if in each run
we can reassure ourselves by asking a ≡-equivalent ques-
tion about the identical system. Note that the answers
across different runs do not need to be the same—only
within the same run.
12 With a suitable probability measure, a system is isolated if and
only if P(A1 = A2 |Q1 ≡ Q2) ∀Q1, Q2 ∈ Q.
e. In retrospect. The notion of an “equivalence of
questions” has been fundamental for establishing a no-
tion of “isolated systems.” The first should, however,
not be regarded as logically prior to the latter—rather,
the two have to be thought of as a mutually dependent,
and to be made sense of together (see Figure 9). In or-
der to establish what is to be considered an equivalent
question, one usually relies on an equivalent use: Two
questions are then equivalent if they yield same answers
in the same context.
Similarly, the notion of “identical systems” is con-
nected to the notion of isolated systems and the notion
of equivalent questions. The initial acceptance of means
beyond quantum mechanics (see Section II) offers the
freedom to relate these notions without the need for an
exhaustive reduction.
isolated system
equivalent questions
Figure 9. Equivalent questions and isolated systems are
merely meaningful concepts if they are considered together.
B. Born rule in a contextual theory
The above considerations on the interaction assumption
have left us with a contextual and probabilistic theory:
For a given question, the theory yields a probability
distribution over the answers, and this probability dis-
tribution depends on inquiries about other questions.
Generally, such a theory assigns to a finite set of ques-
tions Q ⊂ Q a joint probability distribution. We assume
that the possible answers to any questions in Q are con-
tained in a set A. Further, we denote with P′(Q) the
set of finite ordered subsets of Q.13 A probabilistic the-
ory can then be regarded as a map that assigns to each
ordered set Q ∈ P′(Q) a joint probability distribution,
T : Q 7→
{
(x1, . . . , xn) ∈ A
n 7→ P (x1, . . . , xn)
}
. (3)
The theory is contextual if the map T does not derive
from a map
T ′ : Q → Prob(A) (4)
Q 7→
{
x ∈ A 7→ P (x)
}
that assigns to each question independently a probability
distribution.14
13 The order of measurements matters: A system can only be dis-
turbed relative to prior information about it. And this distur-
bance becomes only empirically tangible after a corresponding
interaction occurred.
14 This is not exactly the contextuality in the Kochen/Specker the-
orem [24, 25]: The contradiction in the Kochen/Specker theorem
7a. Non-contextual theories. In the case of a the-
ory of the form (4), the theory is equivalent to a rela-
tion {(Q, x, P (x))} ⊂ Q×A× [0, 1] that associates each
question-answer pair with a probability weight. Such a
theory might stem from a probability distribution over
a Boolean lattice Q × A (see Appendix C). Then, an
interaction cannot “disturb” the measurement result, in
the sense that it alters the probability distribution. The
association of probability distributions is independent of
other measurements. An interaction is merely empiri-
cally tangible insofar as it changes the probability dis-
tribution of other measurements in a contextual theory.
In other words, in a non-contextual theory we have no
empirically tangible way to establish whether a system
is isolated or not, in the sense above—whether or not an
observer interacted with the system to inquire about a
non-implied question (as defined in Paragraph IVA.b).
b. A general Born rule. The map in (3) yields prob-
ability distributions over the possible answers of ques-
tions for a given set of questions—just as the Born rule
does. It can thus be regarded as a generalization of the
Born rule. In the particular case of quantum mechanics,
the states, according to Gleason’s theorem [26], corre-
spond to probability distributions over an orthomodular,
non-distributive lattice (see Appendix C). Generally, the
lattice of questions might be distributive: Then, the con-
textual character of the theory is rather a feature of the
Born rule than a necessity of the formal representation
of questions.
C. Detecting an eavesdropper
Any theory satisfying the interaction assumption (IntA)
allows to derive a key-exchange protocol as the one by
Bennett and Brassard (BB84) [27]. If interactions can
be traced empirically, then also the action of an eaves-
dropper provided that the he cannot guess what is an
equivalent question: Alice inquires a system about a ran-
domly chosen question Q1 ∈ Q, and then sends the sys-
tem to Bob who also chooses a random question Q2 ∈ Q
and inquires about it. If the two questions are equiv-
alent, Q1 ≡ Q2, then Alice and Bob obtain the same
answer. For an eavesdropper to learn something about
the obtained answers, he will have to inquire an equiv-
alent question. If he does not know Alice’s and Bob’s
question, he can merely guess a question. With non-zero
probability, he will choose a non-implied question, and
is merely dependent on the representation of observables as pro-
jectors on Hilbert spaces, the association of these observables
with properties of a system, and the assumption that these ob-
servables have definite values independent of the experimental
context. The contradiction does not involve the Born rule. In
our case, contextuality does not have to be a necessary conse-
quence of the representation of measurements within the theory,
but may as well be due to the form of the Born rule, i.e., how
these operators are assigned probability distributions.
thus disturb the system. The disturbance reveals his in-
tervention to Alice and Bob.
The above shows that the BB84 protocol relies cru-
cially on the dichotomy between isolated systems and sys-
tems interacting with their environment : Either a system
is isolated, or it interacts with its environment. To learn
something about the system, an interaction is necessary.
If interactions leave traces, then one can tell whether
someone could have learnt something about that system.
Conversely, the BB84 protocol can be used to character-
ize what we mean by referring to “isolated systems” or
to “interactions:” Instead of making interactions “em-
pirically tangible,” we could equivalently have strived for
making “an eavesdropper’s actions detectable.”
V. INTERACTIONS WITHIN AN
ISOLATED SYSTEM
So far, we have merely considered interactions of the en-
vironment (or of observers in the environment) with the
system under consideration. We now turn to interactions
within an isolated system, i.e., between different parts of
a joint system. Two systems, S1 and S2, together can
again be regarded as one system assuming the ability to
refer to S1 and S2 suffices to refer to the correspond-
ing combined system. The joint system consisting of S1
and S2 is denoted S1 × S2.
A. Equivalent questions revisited
How does the notion of an isolated system for a com-
bined system relate to the notion of isolated systems for
the subsystems? How do questions in QSc about the
combined system Sc := S1×S2 relate to questions about
the subsystems, i.e., to elements in the Cartesian prod-
uct QS1 × QS2? According to (IntA), there is no dif-
ference if an observer interacted with S1 or another sys-
tem S2 did. Let us consider the scenario depicted in
Figure 10: If one inquires about two equivalent ques-
tions Q1 ≡ Q3 about S1—before and after an interac-
tion with the other subsystem S2—, then the answers
must differ unless the interaction corresponds to inquir-
ing about a question implied by Q1. The same holds,
vice versa, for S2 with respect to inquiries about equiv-
alent questions Q2 ≡ Q4. Thus, for a given interaction
between S1 and S2, there are questions on the subsystem
that detect the interaction. The combined system Sc,
however, did not interact with its environment between
the pair of inquiries (Q1, Q2) and (Q3, Q4). The com-
bined system should still be isolated. Therefore, if two
subsystems interact with each other, the notion of equiv-
alent questions for Sc does not simply derive from the
notion of equivalent questions for S1 and S2. In partic-
ular, the pairs (Q1, Q2) and (Q3, Q4) are not equivalent
questions for Sc unless the interaction corresponds to im-
plied questions for both Q1 on S1 and Q3 on S2.
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Figure 10. If two subsystems, S1 and S2, interact with each
other after the respective inquiries about Q1 and Q2, then
the answers obtained by inquiring about questions Q3 ≡ Q1
and Q4 ≡ Q2, differ from the respective previously obtained
counterparts, as S2 is part of the environment of S1 and vice
versa. If, however, we consider the pair (Q1, Q2) as a question
about the combined system S1 × S2, then we end up with an
isolated system—the interaction is now within the combined
system—that yields different answers to equivalent questions.
If we maintain that S1 × S2 is isolated, then the interaction
changes the notion of equivalent questions for S1 × S2 with
respect to the equivalence classes of S1 and S2.
B. The measurement problem
If we assume that there is no qualitative difference be-
tween a system interacting with another, and a system
interacting with an observer inquiring about a question,
then one is tempted to regard an observer just as a sys-
tem. As one inquired about a question for any system,
one might inquire about the measurement result of an
observer. This leads to a general Wigner’s-friend exper-
S
F
QiS
QiF
QfS
QfF
Qint
AiS
AiF = ∆
AfS
AfF
Figure 11. The behavior of the joint system S × F is char-
acterized by the dependence of the answers AiS, AiF , AfS
and AfF . If this joint system is isolated, then for any pair
of initial questions, there exists an equivalent question Qint
which yields the same answer. The initial questions can then
be chosen so that the system S gets disturbed.
iment: Let us assume that Wigner inquires a system F
about an initial questionQiF with three possible answers,
AiF = {0, 1,∆}, and a system S about an initial ques-
tion QiS with two possible answers, AiS = {0, 1} as de-
picted in Figure 11. The systems F and S then interact so
that if Wigner initially obtains (AiS ,∆), then he finally
gets AfS = AfF = AiS upon inquiring about QfF ≡ QiF
and QfS ≡ QiS . This characterizes the joint, interact-
ing system S ×F : The question (QiS , QiF ) is equivalent
to (QfS , Q
′
fF ) where Q
′
fF is defined so that its answers
are a suitable permutation of the answers of QfF . In
fact, (QfS , QfF ) is then implied by (QfS, Q
′
fF ) and in-
quiring about it does not disturb the joint system.
We now use that if S×F is isolated, then for any pair of
initial questions there exists an equivalent question Qint
that yields the same answer. Wigner changes the ini-
tial question QiS to another, non-equivalent Q
′
iS 6∼ QiS .
Also the combined question (Q′iS , QiF ) is in a different
equivalence class,
Q′int ≡ (Q
′
iS , QiF ) 6∼ (QiS , QiF ) .
Previously, the interaction corresponded for S to the
inquiry about a question implied by QiS : Inquiring
about Qint did not affect the answer AfS = AiS .
This is not the case anymore for Q′iS : The inquiry
about an question Q′int ≡ (Q
′
iS , QiF ) potentially changes
the answer to QfS and vice versa. Either we inquire
about (QfS , QfF ) to obtain the result of the measure-
ment carried out by Wigner’s friend, associated with F .
Then, any subsequent measurement of Qint might yield
a result that differs from the initial (AiS , AiF ): We can-
not regard S × F as an isolated, interacting system. Or
we inquire about Qint and we cannot be sure about the
value the friend obtained in his measurement.15
In quantum mechanics, the measurement problem re-
volves about the question whether a collapse can happen
in an isolated system or not. A collapse occurring inside
an isolated system translates to the question, whether
an isolated system should behave as if a question in the
equivalence class of (QiS , QiF ) had been inquired about.
This is at odds with the interaction assumption itself:
Then the system would look as if it had been interacted
with even though it did not.
VI. LATTICE OF QUESTIONS
In the binary case, questions in Q can be regarded as
statements that are either true or false. A statement can
imply another,
(Q1, t)⇒ (Q2, t) ,
where “⇒” is the notion of implication in ordinary lan-
guage. The implication yields an order relation  on Q:
Q1  Q2 if and only if (Q1, t)⇒ (Q2, t) . (5)
If, in addition, (Q2, t) does not imply (Q1, t), then we
write Q1 ≺ Q2. The negation of a question Q has an
15 The correlation between the answers AfS and AfF might be
preserved, as is the case in quantum mechanics. It is, however,
not clear that this is generally the case.
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Figure 12. The equivalence relation horizontally connects the
vertical lattice structure.
answer t if and only if the answer to Q is f,
(¬Q, t)⇔ (Q, f) .
We assume that there exists a question Qt that is always
answered with t—a tautological question. Similarly we
assume that there is a question f that is always answered
with f—the absurd question. Then, for all questions Q ∈
Q, Qa  Q  Qt. Assuming that the joins and meets
in the partially ordered set (Q,) are unique, the set
of questions together with the implication and negation
forms a complemented lattice (for a brief, visual summary
of lattices, see Appendix C). It seems natural to assume
the negation to be involutional and order-reversing. This
yields an orthocomplemented lattice.
A. Interlacing the lattice structure and the
equivalence relation
It remains to join the lattice structure introduced above
with the equivalence of questions required by verifia-
bility. We would like the lattice structure to be or-
thogonal to the ∼-equivalence in the following sense:
The lattice relates elements in Q that correspond to the
“same time” and the “same run.” The equivalence rela-
tion ∼ relates questions “horizontally” across this “verti-
cal” (sub-)lattice structure (see Figure 12); questions cor-
responding to the “same time” and the “same run” are
not ∼-equivalent. Note that the ∼-equivalence of ques-
tions is then not equal to the bi-directional implication
(Q1, t)⇒ (Q2, t) and (Q1, t)⇐ (Q2, t) . (6)
If there are two ∼-equivalent questions that correspond
to the “same time” and the “same run,” Q1 ∼ Q2, Q1 6=
Q2, then there are questions that are empirically not dis-
tinguishable: If the system is isolated they yield the same
answer. To distinguish the elements nonetheless, we have
to introduce further characteristics for elements inQ with
some context in which they show empirically, thus loos-
ing the uniformity of questions in Q. If, then, any of the
1
0
Figure 13. Joining equivalence classes as depicted here
is problematic as it introduces empirically indistinguishable
questions into the lattice structure.
1
0
1
0
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Figure 14. The equivalence relation horizontally connects par-
titions that form lattices.
two is ∼-equivalent to questions at different times or in
different runs, this corresponds, by transitivity, to join-
ing equivalence classes as depicted in Figure 13. This
reminds of thermodynamics in two respects: There are
different context, the micro- and the macro-context, in
which questions are distinguishable or not; if equivalence
classes join merely in one direction, this yields an ar-
row of time, similar to the 2nd Law. We refrain from
a dualism of contexts here, and, thus, from allowing to
join equivalence classes, as it counters the paradigm of
empirical tangibility.
In the picture we have drawn this far (see Figure 12),
the tautological and the absurd question reach across the
horizontal structure: They bind together the sub-lattices.
To ensure that no two questions in the same sub-lattice
are ∼-equivalent, we require that
Q1 ∼ Q2 ⇒ Q1 ∧Q2 = 0 and Q1 ∨Q2 = 1 . (7)
This requirement is at odds with ortho-complementarity:
The complement is only unique within a sub-lattice; not
anymore across the entire lattice Q. Either we relax
ortho-complementarity to hold merely for sub-lattices, or
we assume that not the entire set Q forms a lattice, but
rather falls can be partitioned into ortho-complemented
lattices and the ∼-equivalence reaches across these par-
titions as depicted in Figure 14.
If we further assume that the equivalence relation pre-
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Figure 15. If the ∼-equivalence relation preserves the lattice
structure, then it can be be carried over to the equivalence
classes.
serves the lattice structure by imposing
Q1 ∼ Q
′
1 andQ1  Q2 ⇒ ∃!Q
′
2 : Q
′
1  Q
′
2 andQ2 ∼ Q
′
2 ,
(8)
then we can lift the lattice structure to the ∼-equivalence
classes as depicted in Figure 15.
B. Isolated systems for lattices of questions
One is drawn to assume that ∼-equivalence relation pre-
serves the lattice structure by the following consistency
requirement for the lattice structure and the notion of
isolated systems: Inquiring about implied questions does
not disturb a system. Consider the scenario in Figure 16:
If there exists a question Q′2 ∈ Q such that
Q1 ≡ Q
′
2 and Q
′
2  Q2 .
Then inquiring about Q2 should not change the answer
obtained when inquiring about Q3 ≡ Q1. We have re-
lated the questions Q1 and Q2 following the lower path
in the following diagram:
Q1
Q2Q
′
1
Q′2
 
∼
∼
If the ∼-equivalence preserves the lattice structure, then
diagram commutes, and there also exists a Q′1 such that
Q1  Q
′
1 and Q
′
1 ≡ Q2 .
If there are multiple Q′1, then there will be joining equiv-
alence classes. Thus, we demand here the uniqueness.
Similarly, we assume that inquiring about the negated
question does not disturb the system.
VII. CONCLUSION
If we require that there is “no observation at a dis-
tance,” and if we regard this requirement itself not ex-
empt from our experience, then we are lead to assume
that any interaction—including those that accompany
Q1 Q2 Q3
A1 A2 A3 = A1
Figure 16. Inquiring about an implied question should not
disturb the answers
our observations—leaves traces. Disturbance and com-
plementarity in contextual, probabilistic theories with
dichotomic notions of an isolated system and an inter-
action are then not a defect. Instead, they turn out to
be a means to render interactions empirically tangible:
An interaction of a system with its environment alters
the context, and, thus, also the probability distribution
for other measurements performed on that system. The
necessity of a Born rule—a non-trivial map from ordered
sets of measurements to probability distributions—is a
consequence.
If interactions within isolated joint systems are qual-
itatively not different from interactions of systems with
an observer, as they are regarded necessary by the in-
teraction assumption, then there emerges a “measure-
ment problem:” In a Gedankenexperiment with encapsu-
lated observers, a` la Wigner’s friend, one can construct
inquiries so that either one can inquire about whether
the encapsulated observer interacted with the system she
measured or what result the encapsulated observer ob-
tained. Either of the inquiries invalidates previously ob-
tained answers to the respective other. We cannot recon-
cile the idea of a measurement yielding a definite result
with the measurement being an interaction within an iso-
lated system.
VIII. EPILOGUE
The antagonism [between the actual language
and our demand for a crystal-clear logic] be-
comes unbearable; the demand is on the verge
to become something empty. — We got onto
the clear ice where there is no friction, where
the conditions are, in a sense, ideal, but also
where we cannot walk. We want to walk; so,
we need the friction. Back onto the rough
ground! [28, §107 (own translation)16]
The quest for certain, eternal, and unalterable knowledge
has lead us onto the frictionless ice—the immutability of
such knowledge necessitates a spectator theory:
16 “Der Widerstreit [zwischen der tatsa¨chlichen Sprache und unsrer
Forderung nach der Kristallklarheit der Logik] wird unertra¨glich;
die Forderung droht nun zu etwas Leerem zu werden. — Wir
sind auf Glatteis geraten, wo die Reibung fehlt, also die Bedin-
gungen in gewissem Sinne ideal sind, aber wir eben deshalb auch
nicht gehen ko¨nnen. Wir wollen gehen; dann brauchen wir die
Reibung. Zuru¨ck auf den rauhen Boden!” [28, §107]
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[T]hat what is known is antecedent to the
mental act of observation and inquiry, and is
totally unaffected by these acts. [. . . ] If the
word ‘interaction’ be used, it cannot denote
that overt production of change it signifies in
its ordinary and practical use. [. . . ] The real
object is the object so fixed in its regal aloof-
ness that it is king to any beholding mind
that may gaze upon it. A spectator theory of
knowledge is the inevitable outcome. [16]
Conversely, rendering interactions, including those
that go with our observations, subject to our
experience—thereby restoring the ordinary meaning of
an “interaction”—requires to leave behind such specta-
tor theories. The measurement problem is the collision
of a spectator notion of an observation with an ordinary
idea of an interaction associated with the act of inquiry.
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Appendix A: Resolution restriction
In [29] and [30], it is assumed that there is an upper
bound on how much information one can have about
a system. We examine how this resolution restriction
emerges in theories satisfying the interaction assumption.
a. Refinement. An ordered family of questions
{Qi}i that refer to the same system, i.e., that are ∼
s-
equivalent, is called a refinement, if any Qi is implied by
its successor Qi+1 as defined in Paragraph IVA.b, i.e.,
∀i : ∃Q′i : Q
′
i ≡ Qi+1 ∧Q
′
i ≻ Qi+1 .
b. Reassurance. A refinement can be reassured in
the following sense: If we inquire about the questions
in its given order, then, at any time, we can reassure
ourselves (i.e., inquire again about) previous questions,17
without disturbing the system. If the system is isolated,
we will then obtain the same answer as to the equivalent
question inquired about previously.
17 Strictly speaking: we mean an inquiry about a≡-equivalent ques-
tion.
c. Resolution restriction. If the lattice (Q,) is
atomic, then any refinement is finite. Then there is only a
finite number of questions that are not ≡-equivalent and
that can be inquired about without invalidating some
of the questions. The resolution restriction, i.e., the as-
sumption that there is a maximal number of questions
one can simultaneously know the answer to, can, thus,
be regarded as a consequence of the interaction assump-
tion together with the assumption that the lattice (Q,)
is atomic.
Appendix B: The “state” of a quantum “system”
How does the above discussion change the perspective
onto quantum mechanics? In the following, we examine
some repercussions.
a. Privileged questions. We have argued in Sec-
tion II that semantic intricacies taint the notion of an
ultimate thing-in-itself, and, thus, also the notion of the
state exhaustively characterizing such an independently
existing thing-in-itself—forming a “state-in-itself.” The
interaction assumption adds to the scepticism regarding a
reification of the state symbols: Even if the state-in-itself
existed, the interaction assumption would bar the epis-
temic access to it. After having asked a question Q, one
may ask refining questions. By the interaction assump-
tion, however, there exists a question Q′ that allows to
detect the inquiry of Q. Then, two pieces of information
constituted from the inquiries about Q and Q′ cannot be
valid simultaneously. Which of the two pieces of informa-
tion does then tell us something about the state-in-itself?
Bohmian mechanics qualifies a “position measurement”
as the measurement that reveals the state-in-itself. But
there seems little in the way to single out the “momen-
tum measurement.”18
b. Observer independence. The formulation of the
“realism assumption” in [31] comes with similar issues:
One [assumption] is that a system has a ‘real
physical state’—not necessarily completely
described by quantum theory, but objective
and independent of the observer. The as-
sumption only needs to hold for systems that
are isolated, and not entangled with other
systems. [31]
The notion of an isolated system differs here from the
one above: The system-in-itself has a state-in-itself—
independent of an observer. This puts the state in a
18 Instead of assuming that “everything is, in the end, a position
measurement,” one may follow the argumentation in Section II
or return to Bohr’s or Popper’s argument (see Section II C)
against a simple reading off of pointer positions: If a mea-
surement goes necessarily with an interaction, then everything
might be regarded as a “momentum measurement.” In the
“reading-off-picture” the position measurement is fundamental,
in an “interaction-picture” the momentum measurement can be
regarded as fundamental.
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demon-like perspective19: If one can merely say some-
thing about that state after experience and correspond-
ing interactions, then a state independent of the observer
remains a rather abstract concept.
c. Gleason’s theorem. Instead of regarding epistem-
ically inaccessible symbols or answers to distinguished
questions as the “state-in-itself,” we follow the direc-
tion of Gleason’s theorem [26]: If we choose to represent
the ∼-equivalence classes of questions by projectors on
a Hilbert space, then—if the dimension is greater than
two—the probability distributions over these projectors
are in a one-to-one correspondence with the density ma-
trices on that Hilbert space. Therefore, the state sym-
bols of quantum mechanics can be regarded as the prob-
ability distributions over the ∼-equivalence classes. The
collapse is an initial choice of a probability distribution.
It corresponds to the assumption that, without further
knowledge, we take a system to be isolated and, there-
fore, expect to obtain the same answer to subsequent,
≡-equivalent questions.
d. Infinitely many questions. Even though one may
assume that there are merely finitely many answers—we
restrict ourselves to binary questions above—, this does
not imply restrictions on the number of ∼-equivalence
classes of questions. Then, the number of states must
be equally unbounded. This yields a variant of Hardy’s
theorem [32]. In [33], the continuity of the underlying
mathematical structure is regarded as a strange aspect
of quantum mechanics.20
Hardy’s theorem together with results such
as Holevo’s bound and the discreteness of er-
rors, show that precisely the opposite is the
case: it is instead the continuity of quantum
physics that is so strange. How can it be
that we have a continuum of quantum states
that ostenibly behave discretely but we do not
have, and cannot have, an underlying discrete
structure? [33, §3.2]
The continuity merely appears strange if one elevates the
quantum state to the thing-in-itself together with an as-
sumption of epistemic transparency—the tenet of the im-
mediate sensory accessibility of the thing-in-itself.
The conclusion that
even the most primitive quantum system
must contain an infinite amount of informa-
tion [33, §3.2]
relies on an imprecise use of the term “information”:
Even in an atomic lattice of questions with a resolu-
tion restrict resulting from the interaction assumption
as argued in Appendix A, there may be infinitely many
∼-equivalence classes of questions: There might be only
finite sets of questions so that all their answers can be re-
produced without disturbing other questions in that set.
The ability of asking arbitrarily many questions should
not be confused with the ability of having reproducible
answers to all these questions.
Appendix C: Overview of quantum logic
Figure 17 gives a brief introduction to lattices and sum-
marizes import result in quantum logic (see [35–38]).
The terms in the blue boxes form a sequence of nar-
rowing definitions, starting from a lattice (Box 1©): A
partially ordered set (L,≤) is called a lattice if any two
elements a, b ∈ L have a unique least upper bound
or join, a ∨ b, and a unique greatest lower bound or
meet, a∧ b. A lattice is bounded if there exists a greatest
element, 1 ≥ a ∀a ∈ L, and a least element, 0 ≤ a ∀a ∈ L.
A bounded lattice is complemented if for all a ∈ L there
exists a b ∈ L so that a∧ b = 0 and a∨ b = 1 (Box 2©). If
one can choose among the complements of elements a ∈ L
one, such that (a⊥)⊥ = a, and the complement reverses
the order, i.e., a ≤ b ⇒ b⊥ ≤ a⊥, then such a map is
called an orthocomplementation and the resulting lattice
is called orthocomplemented (Box 3©). In the lattice of
closed subspaces of a Hilbert space ordered by the set-
inclusion of their ranges, L(H), orthogonality yields an
orthocomplementation. The resulting lattice is ortho-
modular, i.e., ∀a, b ∈ L, a ≤ b : a∨ (a⊥ ∧ b) = b (Box 4©).
The lattice L(H) is, however, not distributive, and, thus,
not a Boolean lattice (Box 5©): The theorems by Jauch
and Piron [39], Kochen and Specker [24], and Gleason [26]
limit the possibility of quantum mechanics being a non-
contextual theory. In the contrary, we develop a perspec-
tive in which a theory should be contextual, and, thus, not
require the structure of a distributive lattice.
19 “One might say that all these difficulties arise from the fact that
the story of the Laplacean demon is an attempt to eliminate the
vague and dangerous phrase ‘in principle.’ For what it tries to
explain is what we mean when we say that the future states of a
system can be ‘in principle’ predicted on the basis of a knowledge
of past or present states. ‘In principle’ means here something like
‘not in practice, because human knowledge is never sufficiently
precise and complete.’ No wonder that, in attempting to explain
what we mean by ‘in principle,’ Laplace was driven to a superhu-
man intelligence. But the Laplacean demon is unsatisfactory, we
may say, just because infinitely precise and complete knowledge
is also ‘in principle’ unattainable.” [17]
20 As noted in [33], the step from infinite states to a continuous
state space is shown in [34].
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1
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2
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a ∨ (a⊥ ∧ c) = c
4
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Figure 17. A brief summary of lattices and quantum logic.
